This paper examines how external third-parties, such as international organizations, can play a role in facilitating the development of security community and international integration within post-conflict societies. The formation of a security community includes the emergence of trust, belongingness, and reconciliation, along with internalizing the notion of resolving conflicts in a peaceful manner. This paper studies the roles of the EU and NATO in potentially fostering a regional security community in the Western Balkans. Both organizations have become heavily involved and invested in the region attempting to extend to the area the well established security community that exists among Europe and its Trans-Atlantic partners, while all the countries of the Western Balkan region have expressed a desire to join European institutions and become a part of the Euro-Atlantic community. But what are the implications of external encouragement of security community? The socialization of individual countries, rather than the region as a whole, contributes more to each country's self-perception as a member state rather than as a part of a regional community. This study offers unique insight into how and why feelings of trust and a sense of community can be encouraged by external actors -and how and why trust and community can filter down to the most local level within post-conflict societies. Such insight will further interests in enhancing conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.
Introduction
The six countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina [BiH] , Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro) 1 have commanded significant international attention over the past decade. This troubled area has experienced much violent conflict in recent years and continues to suffer from tension and instability today. The Western Balkan region will soon be entirely surrounded by EU and NATO members, yet most will remain on the outskirts of the Western community for the foreseeable future. These countries, after all, are hard cases for European integration. In addition to engaging in recent violent conflict and exhibiting lesser developed political and economic systems, these countries continue to experience ethnic tensions, border disputes, immigration and refugee concerns, poor infrastructures, a diffusion of weaponry, and significant problems associated with organized crime and corruption. Moreover, one of these countries was a target of Western military action (Serbia) and two countries remain under international protection (BiH and the Kosovo region of Serbia).
Despite and because of these facts, Western countries and international organizations (IOs) have become heavily involved and invested in the region attempting to extend to the area the well established security community that exists among Europe and its Trans-Atlantic partners. 2 All the countries of the Western Balkan region have expressed a desire to join
European institutions and become a part of the Euro-Atlantic community. Euro-Atlantic
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Draft Copy -Please do not cite without permission University of Oklahoma address the problematic nature of post-civil-conflict societies where many security concerns emanate not from external threats but internal ones. Studies of security community also do not focus on the ways in which a security community is created and/or encouraged by IOs. This study, therefore, offers several practical and theoretical implications. Theoretically, the study contributes to the growing body of international relations literature that addresses both material and non-material causes of security cooperation. It will also broaden the study of security community to help us understand the ways in which such community can develop with the help of IOs in post-civil-conflict societies. Practically, the findings will allow us to highlight the sociological consequences of international involvement in the Western Balkan region in an effort to develop best practices for IO engagement in post-conflict areas.
What follows is an overview of the concept of security community, an synopsis of the role that IOs can play, an outline of the theoretical expectations specific to the Western Balkan region which includes the research hypothesis and expected behavior for this paper, a short discussion of the history of violent conflict in the Western Balkan region, an assessment of international interaction with the region in an effort to develop a sense of security community in the Western Balkans, and a conclusion that highlights our findings and suggests the direction for future research.
The Evolution of Security Community
Concerning communities at the international level, scholars have suggested that groups of states form a "society" when they are aware of common interests and values, and shared interpretations of reality. They consider themselves to be bounded by the same sets of rules in their relations with each other, and share the same affinity for common institutional practices.
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The states that comprise an "international society" or "community" interact in such a way that they unilaterally and unconsciously consider each other, their common values and sets of rules as factors before selecting a course of action. 5 Such "communities" at the international level have helped scholars understand how and why states come to cooperate on matters of security. As in other communities, members of a "security community" share a common identification. More specifically, however, they expect that they can solve common social problems together without resorting to violent or aggressive behavior.
6 "A security community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way."
7
Political scientists have often employed the psychological and social-psychological concepts of identity when studying political behavior. Over five decades ago, Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan suggested that "identification serves as the mechanism for the creation of the political 'we.' It is the 'we' which lies at the center of political phenomena." 8 Political identity has helped scholars understand and explain behavior among and between political groups such as soldiers and officers; armies and civilians; ethnicities and nations. 
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9 It helps us understand how and why individuals behave as they do, as well as how and why collectivities behave, in the political realm. Identification helps explain the dynamics of nation-building with the coming together of many individuals because of a common perception of a national identity;
and it helps explain the collective actions of one nation as together it seeks to protect and enhance its identity. 10 Moreover, identification allows us to explore the possibility of "transnational identities" that will affect political processes on a global scale. 11 In other words, identity fosters our exploration, understanding and explanation of political cooperation and international integration.
Most scholars who study the concept of security community tend to focus on what Karl
Deutsch calls pluralistic security community (PSC). 12 Members of a PSC operate based on "mutual responsiveness." Their shared identity, sense of sympathy, loyalty and "we-feeling" allow PSC members to predict each others behavior, and cooperate accordingly. 13 Moreover, PSC members "frame problems and solutions according to shared values and redefine security as a community, rather than a state or interstate problem." 14 Such conditions make violent behavior among and between PSC members much less likely as together they seek the peaceful resolution of security problems. Adler and Barnett highlight how "Deutsch observed a pluralistic security community whenever states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community, 
Draft Copy -Please do not cite without permission University of Oklahoma which, in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war. In short, Deutsch claimed that those states that dwell in a security community had created not simply a stable order but, in fact, a stable peace." 15 The notion of interaction is of extreme importance to the understanding of PSCs and the subsequent behavior of their members. Karl Deutsch emphasized, for example, "communication" and "transaction flows" among states as the keys to community building and peaceful relations. Positive interaction, he argued, creates the "we-feeling" and the "sense of community."
16 Scholars such as Emanuel Adler have expounded on Deutsch's focus on interstate communications and transactions to highlight the "learning" processes involved in the creation, maintenance and enhancement of PSCs. Specifically, Adler suggests that PSC members must learn and be socialized into the "we" of a community. He argues that this involves:
the adoption by policymakers of new interpretations of reality, as they are created and introduced to the political system by individuals and institutions. This implies that national policymakers are subject to absorbing new meanings and interpretations of reality, as generated in intellectual, bureaucratic, and political circles, and therefore are subject to changing their interests and ability and/or willingness to consider new courses of action. Seen in this light, learning increases the capacity and motivation to understand competing alternatives to a currently entertained inference and becomes a creative process by which alternatives and preferences or "interests" are generated. Although the power of IOs to socialize and persuade has been well-theorized, less work has focused on the specific power of IOs to foster a political security community -one which is accompanied by a shared regional identity -in regions where none previously existed, or has been drastically altered due to violent conflict. Our research attempts to tie together theories of 27 Ibid., p.499. 28 Ibid.
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Theoretical Expectations and Empirical Indicators
Based on existing literature, we can trace the potential development of security community in the Western Balkan region and outline the various kinds of empirical evidence that demonstrate the effects of mutual trust and collective identity. Adler and Barnett, for example, suggest that three tiers of community development highlight the factors leading to community development. The first tier, consisting of "precipitating conditions," includes those factors that might spark states to "begin to orient themselves in each other's direction and desire to coordinate their relations."
29 Factors such as technological advances; demographic, economic and environmental changes; external threats; and changed ideas or perceptions about "social reality" can precipitate the beginnings of security cooperation.
The second tier reflects both structural and procedural factors -factors that are conducive to the development of a security community. In terms of structure, both power and knowledge are relevant. Power refers to the role of certain powerful actors in the development of security community, while knowledge refers to the various ideas, such as liberal democracy, civil society, rule of law, and human rights, that facilitate the creation of trust and a sense of community.
Regarding process, members of a security community are expected to engage in increasing transactions of various kinds, quality, and quantity. International organizations also play a 29 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, pp. 37-38.
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Draft Copy -Please do not cite without permission University of Oklahoma significant role procedurally in that they enhance the creation of norms, allow members to monitor, and increase trust. International organizations are related to the third process factorsocial learning. Security community emerges following a process of teaching and learning, and international organizations play a significant role in that process. Ultimately, "by promoting the development of shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international action and regional boundaries, social learning encourages political actors to see each other as trustworthy.
And it also leads people to identify with those who were once on the other side of cognitive divides." 30 Finally, the third tier includes the "necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change."
31 These conditions involve mutual trust and collective identity, which are "reciprocal and reinforcing." 32 At this level, "states no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust, but do so through knowledge and beliefs about the other."
33
Based on these three tiers, Adler and Barnett suggest that security communities develop in three phases. The first, "nascent" phase exhibits all the characteristics present in tier one and some of those present at tier two. 34 In the second, "ascendant" phase, security communities demonstrate tighter relations that are increasingly deeper over time. Tier two factors are entirely present and some tier three characteristics might be evident. 35 Finally, in the "mature" phase, security communities are entirely developed and stabled.
Research Hypothesis and Expected Behavior:
Based on the theoretical understanding of security community, our hypothesis is: 30 Ibid., p. 45. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., p. 46. 34 Ibid., pp. 50-53. 35 Ibid., pp. 53-55.
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To examine this hypothesis, it is necessary to consider the actions of external actors in the region. This entails an in depth analysis of two of the major IOs present in the region (the EU and NATO) and their interactions with the six countries of the Western Balkans. This includes looking at the various programs that these external organizations advance and the requirements that partnership with the IO mandates. To operationalize the independent variable we look for evidence of IO engagement in the region and IO facilitation of positively rewarding activities and internal interaction. Such evidence includes IO initiatives and programs that reward state behavior geared towards developing a regional security community, and/or that attach IO rewards to regional community development. For the dependent variable -the development of a security community, feelings of trust and mutual responsiveness -we expect to see heightened interactions and transaction flows along cultural, educational, economic and political channels; policy statements geared towards reconciliation in the region; and a rise in regional identification, measured by language that demonstrates these countries view each other as less threatening than they once did. Borrowing Ikenberry and Kupchan's notion of socialization being complementary to the manipulation of material incentives, we borrow their causal chain of "acts before beliefs", where external inducement leads to policy change, which then in turn slowly leads to norm change. 36 Our methodological choices are driven by our research questions. Non-material factors, such as trust, sense of belonging, and feelings of reconciliation, are admittedly challenging for social scientific inquiry. Despite the challenges, however, analysis of these concepts and issues is 36 Ikenberry and Kupchan, p. 291.
Draft Copy -Please do not cite without permission University of Oklahoma critical for an understanding of how peace and stability can be fostered through the external encouragement of a joint regional identity and sense of community. Qualitative methods provide a measurement of the role and internalization of security community. A better understanding of how trust, belonging, and reconciliation emerge will help create a clearer image of how external actors may help to resolve and prevent conflict. independence, but this step was met with Serbian resistance. 38 The deadly Bosnian conflict continued until 1995. After three years of inadequate European and international response, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was enacted to preserve a US-enforced armistice. It is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed, and over one million were displaced. Other Western While the recent history of the Western Balkans has been characterized by extremely violent conflict -which has included and enhanced the accompanying problems of corruption, instability, poverty and smuggling -it has also been the site of significant international involvement. Because of the events of the 1990s, the Western Balkans has received a great deal of international attention and involvement. This is significant in light of Ikenberry and Kupchan's hypothesis that socialization is more likely to occur after wars and political crises. 
Violent Conflict in the Western
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In essence, EU membership acts as a catalyst for structural reforms. While the general carrotand-stick metaphor of EU membership follows the same Copenhagen criteria as previous EU expansion and integration projects, the SAP is a specific attempt to address the conditions of South-East Europe through addressing the particular legacy of ethnic conflict in the region. This is done through a slower and more gradual timeline for institutional development than has been the expectation for previous enlargement candidates, and through emphasizing regional cooperation in recognition of the region's tumultuous history. Enhancement of the Regional Approach, which has until now provided the framework for the development of relations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania; a tailor-made, progressive approach that takes into account the individual situation of each country. Some countries can progress faster than others…Asymmetric trade liberalization; economic and financial assistance, budgetary assistance and balance of payment support; assistance for democratization and civil society; humanitarian aid for refugees, 57 
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Balkan security community, in this argument, is indirect -NATO's influence extends primarily to encouraging the domestic stability of democratic institutions. Nathan corroborates this notion, and asserts that domestic stability is a necessary condition for security community. If states are to rely on dependable peaceful expectations of one another, stability within states ought to be as important a benchmark as stability between states; otherwise the possibility of cross-border violence and unrest looms large. 67 The formal basis for PfP is the 'Framework Document', which sets out specific undertakings for each candidate country. A partnership is formed between each country and NATO to encourage the country to implement a number of generalized political commitments and specific security agendas. The former includes the maintenance and preservation of the principles of international law, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and various international border agreements, arms agreements, and dispute settlement mechanisms.
The latter entails increasing transparency and institutionalization of national defense systems, establishing civilian control over armed forces, cooperation in seeking out war-criminals, and eventually, to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in future peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. 68 NATO has often proclaimed its dedication to advancement for the region. In 2003, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson commented "… NATO is committed to helping achieve the goal of a more secure, a more prosperous and more integrated Western
Draft Copy -Please do not cite without permission University of Oklahoma troops to ensure stability but of providing expert assistance, building true partnership and holding out the prospect of eventual Alliance membership." 69 Kydd examines the criteria behind the NATO enlargement rounds, and concludes that the degree of uncertainty surrounding a state's motivations is positively related to the price of membership: "If states are relatively certain about one another's preferences, there will be little reason to have a high entry price for an institution, because state motivations, benign or malign, will already be known." 70 In this sense, the price of membership represents the degree of socialization necessary to accommodate the new member.
An oversimplified generalization of the distinction between EU-led efforts and NATOled efforts in the region would be to characterize EU involvement as primarily economic and institutional and NATO's as primarily security and defense. This polarization, however, does not capture the efforts of each international organization to deal with the symbiotic relationship of political and market structures. In Macedonia, for example, the EU began to take on a security role, as its operations during the 2001 crisis there were the first sole military operations for the Union. 71 Although the nature of NATO's engagement has changed since SFOR, the alliance has retained military headquarters in BiH and has increased its influence in the region's security development. This involvement extends to counter-terrorism efforts, apprehending war-crimes suspects, and civil-military reform. 72 While it is clear that external third party actors are heavily involved in the Western
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The international push toward regional cooperation leads some observers to question the motivations of external actors. Some research asserts that international organizations such as the EU and NATO intentionally maintain externally-led efforts in the Balkan region as a means of enhancing their own legitimacy. Borinski states that NATO is taking advantage of the 'window of opportunity' in the Balkans to achieve a "double enlargement" -involving simultaneous geographical and mission profile enlargement as the linchpin of NATO policy -with the objective of achieving a political success story for the organization's own standing rather then based on strategy alone. 74 Vachudova asserts a similar hypothesis for the EU -the EU's willingness to consider future expansion to such a troublesome region is in part explainable by the material benefits the EU could accrue: "only by stabilizing the Balkans can the EU hope to make its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more credible and boost its clout as a geopolitical actor." 75 Ikenberry and Kupchan's notion of socialization offers a bigger picture to this contention. A hegemon (which we interpret as a proxy for an IO) could not be expected to interfere with a secondary state unless there were material benefits to gain from interference.
Socialization occurs independent of a hegemon's motives, and accompanies the material benefits as domestic actors eventually internalize a hegemon's substantive beliefs along with any tangible gains they accrue. Progress Report on Albania, BiH, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo states that more constructive and productive political dialogue needs to be maintained between Kosovo and Serbia-Montenegro (previous to the Montenegro referendum). 77 In essence, IOs utilize language concerning community-building, but so far lack the mechanisms to credibly monitor and enforce results.
Regional Identity
Although international organizations have attempted to foster a collective identity through their membership and participation requirements, the approach has remained predominantly bilateral. This suggests that the main source of commonality among the Western Balkans is the effort to become a European member-state. It is important to remember that the states of the area have recently thought of themselves as adversaries rather than as a regional block. It is reasonable to suppose that a certain amount of trust and shared identity must arise complication of such a strategy is that it neglects to foster trust and socialization among Balkan neighbors from the ground-level instead of from the top-down. 85 While exogenously mandated, signs of regional (or sub-regional) cooperation do exist.
Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the creation of the Adriatic Group as formed under the Adriatic Charter. Initially established as a means by which to work together toward NATO membership, the countries of Macedonia, Croatia and Albania have formed a sub-regional alliance that allows them to work both independently and collectively toward meeting NATO requirements. This is significant, because it has led to elite discourse across the three states as well as a realization among the leaders that they share common concerns and goals. 86 The codification of the Adriatic Group came with the signing of the Adriatic Charter on The endurance and apparent success of the sub-regional Adriatic Group has led to efforts to extend the cooperation to the entire region. In November 2005, the Adriatic group met once again to discuss their path(s) toward NATO membership. Representatives from BiH, Serbia and NATO-member Bulgaria were also present indicating a remarkable feat given the recent discord among these states. 89 The common goal of membership appears to be creating more amicable relations, though there is certainly a long way to go before regional cooperation becomes an internalized and fully realized goal.
With regard to our stated theoretical expectation, the first tier is not only present but appears to be so predominantly in response to IO encouragement. The second tier of theoretical expectations, involving not only the structural power of external actors and the processes of transactions and exchanges, but also the knowledge-based power of ideas, values, and norms inherent in developing a security community, is less visible.
Evidence of peace and security stabilization independent of any IO could illustrate the shaping power of knowledge, however most elite discourse in the region concerning community-building appears to be in response to IO-level criteria. Other areas where one might expect to find transaction flows -migration, tourism, cultural, and educational exchanges -are not sufficiently developed enough to offer empirical evidence. One area of note, however, is that existing forms of cultural tourism remain organized through external actors. Much like trade and security policies, many attempts at promoting tourism or migration within the Western Balkan region lie with international organizations and external efforts. 93 Croatia, for example, has tagged much of its economic hopes on attracting European tourism to its famous coastline, yet there seems little indication that they are simultaneously attempting to encourage their immediate neighbors to vacation on the Croatian shores. Taken together, the Western Balkan region appears to be in the process of developing the second tier of theoretical expectations, albeit slowly, and not in an entirely linear fashion. This is not necessarily pessimistic for the eventual development of a security community, as Ikenberry and Kupchan indicate, if the countries are in process of internalizing IO norms to ultimately adopt them as their own. It remains to be seen, however, whether the current level of security community development in the region will ultimately prevent violent conflict within and among Western Balkan countries.
Conclusions, Implications, and Suggestions for Future Research
Judging from evidence to date, the ability of IOs to foster a security community within the Western Balkan appears mixed. The hypothesis, which asks whether a security community is most likely to develop in post-conflict societies when IOs engage and facilitate positively rewarding activities and internal interaction, cannot be conclusively supported at this juncture. It is reasonable to surmise that IOs could have the potential to reinforce and encourage the seeds of a regional security community that already exist, but cannot in and of themselves create a security community where no previous community exists or where it has been seriously damaged by violent conflict. The emphasis on membership within both the EU and NATO has motivated a series of actions towards structural reforms in each of the countries, but the socialization process has been geared primarily towards a shared identity of being 'European' rather than 'Balkan'. This does seem to be changing as the EU, at least, has developed a more local, regional approach by suggesting that "Regional cooperation in the western Balkans is...a catalyst for reconciliation, good-neighbourliness and good political relations."
95 Nonetheless, the opinion polls from the Ultimately, international efforts at promoting security in the Balkan region remain ad hoc arrangements with mixed results. 96 The carrot-and-stick strategy of membership into elite international organizations holds promise as a general incentive for states to initiate reforms around European-prescribed norms, but lacks prescriptive elements that are truly attuned to assuaging the lack of trust and communication among the countries. Despite the lack of attention directed at promoting local security communities among the Balkan states themselves, general progress in political areas such as judicial and police reforms do demonstrate the potential that membership in international organizations holds for certain internal reforms.
97
Based on this analysis of security community development in the Western Balkans, it seems evident that IOs are an important presence in the region. It is also clear, however, that a sense of community is largely emerging between Europe and the Western Balkan countries individually, rather than within and among each of the countries in the region. Moreover, the bilateral relationships that have emerged between Western Balkan countries and these important
IOs have yet to reach the unmediated and multi-faceted level of interaction that is evident in more developed security communities. At the same time, the idea that communities are mental constructs that provide a referent for identification is somewhat illustrated by the idea of 'membership' in either the EU or NATO, given that each Western Balkan country appears ready to discuss difficult reforms as long as membership is held out as a future reward.
96 Gallagher, p. 185. 97 For details see the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs website, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/external/balkans/fsj_external_balkans_en.htm.
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Although an established security community that facilitates predictive, peaceful behavior is something that remains to be seen in the Western Balkan context, some initial indicators may be present given that deeper trade agreements are unfolding, an Adriatic Partnership is emerging, and a historically troubled entity like Serbia-Montenegro was able to successfully hold a referendum according to established liberal democratic principles. These facts demonstrate that a security community is possible, but remains rather weak and under-developed at this stage. In other words, the Western Balkans have accomplished the first tier of security community development, are beginning to demonstrate some characteristics inherent to the second tier, but are still far from internalizing the third tier. A significant amount of 'nascent' conditions existprecipitating factors such as external third parties, the promise of EU and NATO membership, heightened trade and economic possibilities, and the need for contained security -as do a number of 'ascendant' conditions, such as powerful IO actors and a process of social learning.
But the region is still considerably far from approaching the 'mature' phase of a security community. The early phases of security community that are apparent are clearly supported by the involvement of external actors, as our hypothesis anticipated. It is no mistake that the Adriatic Group comprises the two countries in the region that have reached EU candidate status (Croatia and Macedonia). While Albania lags behind, it has still made substantial progress with the help of international organizations. It is also in these three countries where the chances for a permanent peace and the non-violent resolution of conflict seem the most plausible, though field research is necessary to confirm this.
These things taken together suggest that the sociological consequences of international involvement have been positive for initial developments. What is needed is continued engagement and further research in order to understand the deeper and more permanent Grillot, D'Erman and Cruise Draft Copy -Please do not cite without permission University of Oklahoma consequences for community-building in the region. Specifically, we must focus our efforts now on more fully and deeply gauging the existence of trust, mutual responsiveness, and collective identity within and among these Western Balkan countries. Only then can we understand the extent to which these countries have moved beyond the consideration of violent resolution of conflict -and the extent to which external third parties, such as the EU and NATO, have and can enhance the development of security community in post-conflict zones.
